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EXPANSION AND RESTRICTION: COMPETING
PRESSURES ON UNITED KINGDOM ASYLUM
POLICY
ELIZABETH KEYES

*

INTRODUCTION

In November 2002, the British Parliament passed new legislation
reforming its asylum system. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum
Act of 2002 is only the latest in a series of recent attempts to respond to
domestic political pressures created largely by the rising number of
asylum-seekers in the United Kingdom. In addition to domestic pressures,
the United Kingdom is finding itself increasingly implicated in European
developments. As an island nation, the UK historically had a high degree
of autonomy to set its immigration and asylum policies. insulated from
the pressures felt by Europe during times of refugee crisis. As the UK
became increasingly engaged in the process of Europeanization in the
1990s, however, this autonomy began to diminish. While debating the
most recent reform to the British asylum system, the government had to
contend with the prospect of literally thousands of asylum-seekers in the
Sangatte refugee camp in France, poised at the gates of the Eurotunnel,
waiting to cross the English Channel to apply for asylum in the United
Kingdom. Sangatte in many ways symbolized the enormous number and
diverse sources of new restrictionist pressures bearing upon UK asylum
policy.
Such pressures, however, have simultaneously contended with the increasing commitment to the protection of human rights within the United Kingdom and across Europe. The commitment to human rights creates countervailing pressures to expand asylum protections even while many aspects of
domestic politics call for their restriction. One indication of how such
pressures have come to light in the UK was the British Parliament's passage
of the Human Rights Act in 1998. This Act incorporated into domestic law
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which contains several
rights relevant to asylum-seekers. The Act and the enthusiastic embrace of
the ECHR by British courts show how expansionist pressures are also being
felt in UK asylum policy.
* B.A .• Carleton College; M.P.A., Princeton University; J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University
Law Center, May 2004. I would like to thank Susan Martin for her comments on earlier drafts of this
note, and my husband Nicholas Hill for his comments and his constant, patient support.
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Analysis of asylum policy in the United Kingdom thus requires examination of the complex interaction between domestic and international pressures,
between legislative and judicial action, and between expansionism and
restrictionism. In Part I, this paper considers the history of asylum in the UK
through the 1990s, looking at the changes that occurred over the 20th century,
and the international legal obligations at the core of the UK's asylum policy.
The paper specifically addresses Britain's new commitments to European
Union asylum policies, and the ways in which Britain's overall relationship
with the EU affects Britain's domestic asylum policy. In Part II, the paper
examines the two most significant recent changes in UK asylum law, namely
the passage of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002, and the
passage and implementation of the Human Rights Act in 1998. Finally, in
Part III, the paper situates each of these major developments in the wider
context of the various forces for expansion and restriction, in the UK and
Europe. The paper concludes by examining the balance that may be struck as
these forces interact.
I.

ASYLUM LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

A. Historical Overview
The United Kingdom's experience with refugees goes back as far as 16th
century England, when gypsies arrived having fled persecution as far away as
the Balkans and Northern India.! The dawn of the 20 th century found large
numbers of Jews fleeing pogroms in Russia; these refugees provoked
widespread social concerns about threats to domestic labor, housing shortages and a rise in crime? The British parliament responded with the 1905
Aliens Act, recognizing the rights of political and religious refugees. 3 In the
mid-1930's, a wave ofrefugees fleeing Nazi Germany began to arrive, again
provoking concerns that bordered on xenophobia and whose echoes can be
heard in today's debates. 4 Popular anti-Semitism was mirrored in Britain's
immigration laws, which were actually tightened in the final days before the
start of World War 11.5
After World War II, the next waves of refugees came from Eastern Europe.
An estimated 250,000 Polish refugees, and 50,000 other refugees from
Eastern Europe arrived in the United Kingdom in the 1940's and 50'S.6

I. PRAKASH SHAH, REFUGEES, RACE AND THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF ASYLUM IN BRITAIN 13 (2000).
2. [d. at 32.
3. [d. at 34-36 (noting that one observer at the time described this as "the most comprehensive
declaration of the right to asylum that is to be found ... throughout the civilised world").
4. Anne Karpf, We've Been Here Before, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 8, 2002, at 20
(comparing today's public perceptions of refugees with the "rabid intolerance" of earlier times).
5. [d.
6. REFUGEE COUNCIL, ANNUAL UK ASYLUM STATISTICS (using numbers drawn from Home Office
statistics), available at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uklinfocentre/stats/statsOOl.htm (last visited
Jan. 22, 2004).
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17,000 Hungarians arrived following the crushed 1956 Hungarian antiCommunist uprising. Unlike later waves of refugees, those fleeing Communism found ready welcome because they most closely matched the public's
perception of what a refugee was - the Refugee Convention definition of
refugee having been set up at least partially to encompass those persecuted
under Communism. 7
Starting in the 1960's, refugees arrived primarily from developing countries, particularly countries that were members of the British Commonwealth. During this period, the British Parliament made efforts to grapple
with questions of citizenship and the right of Commonwealth citizens to
emigrate to the United Kingdom, seldom invoking the concept of asylum. s In
1962, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act introduced the first, light controls
on the movement of Commonwealth citizens, requiring passports to travel
and introducing punishments for such actions as producing false documents
or staying beyond a permitted date. 9 Events in East Africa soon forced a
re-evaluation of this Act.
In the 1960's, restrictive anti-Asian legislation in East Africa prompted a
large wave of immigrants to come to the United Kingdom. 10 These immigrants - predominantly of Indian origin - were citizens of the British
Commonwealth, and the first of these waves were free from immigration
controls as a result of this citizenship. In 1968, however, the Parliament
passed the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, restricting the rights of commonwealth immigrants to travel freely to Britain. II This policy was sorely tested
during the Ugandan Asians crisis of 1972, when Ugandan President Idi Amin
overnight decided to expel the substantial community of Asians living in
Uganda, many of whom were second and third-generation residents of
Uganda. The United Kingdom did its utmost to ensure that this overnight
class of refugees dispersed to other Commonwealth countries, but ultimately
accepted 27,000 of the 50,000 refugees. 12
The British Parliament passed the 1971 Immigration Act, responding to
the ongoing Asian refugee crisis through the lens of citizenship. The Act
confined lawful residence to British citizens, and certain Commonwealth
citizens,13 and established the basic administrative and appeals procedures
surrounding immigration. 14 It was accompanied by a series of Immigration
Rules, wherein the government gave broad discretion to immigration officers
to determine who did and did not fit the definition of a refugee under the

7. SHAH, supra note I, at 60.
8. SHAH, supra note I, at 74-77. Asylum guidelines were not part of published pulicies, but were
instead communicated to immigration officers by unpublished directives. [d. at 77.
9. [d.
10. [d. at 80-94.
II.
12.

[d.
[d. at 86.

13.

Immigration Act, c. 17, § 2(1) (1971) (Eng.).

14.

[d. at Part Ill, sched. 3.
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Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. 15 The 1971 Act was amended in
1976 by the Race Relations Act, which created an exception to a general
principle of non-discrimination, permitting discrimination with respect to
ethnicity and nationality in the field of immigration. 16 These Acts remained
in place until the series of reforms in the 1990s, discussed in Section B, infra.
The origin and number of refugees arriving in the United Kingdom has
changed dramatically over the past several decades, as the "push" factors
from around the world have changed. In the 1970's and 1980's, the UK
received a steady flow of refugees from Vietnam and from Sri Lanka. 17 Sri
Lankan refugees have continued to seek asylum in the UK, but by 1985 the
number of refugees from the Middle East, Africa and Central Europe
overtook the number of refugees arriving from Asia. 18
These changes occurred in response to various international conflicts and
civil wars. In 1992, at the height of the Balkans war, there was a peak in
applications from the former Yugoslavia (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
is still among the top 10 applicant nationalities as of 2002). In 2000 and 2001,
almost 15,000 refugees from Afghanistan sought asylum in the UK, more
than 5000 of whom were granted exceptional leave to remain in 2001. 19
Following the increasing persecution of white farmers and general political
repression in Zimbabwe in 2000 and 2001, more than 3000 Zimbabweans
turned to the UK for asylum?O In 2002, the main sources of refugees in the
UK were Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Zimbabwe; these four countries
comprise roughly 40% of the total applications for asylum from around the
world. 21
Even more striking than the changing origins of asylum-seekers, however,
is the dramatic increase in numbers of asylum applications. From 1950 to
1980, approximately 159,000 refugees sought asylum in the UK?2 Ofthese,
only 40,000 were individual applicants; the others were members of groups
welcomed by the UK government (such as Polish and Hungarian refugees,
Chileans fleeing Pinochet, etc). In the 1980s there was a slow increase in the
numbers of individual applicants and then, as is reflected in the chart below,
the numbers increased exponentially in the 1990s.
Thus, the UK went from 40,000 applications over 30 years, to roughly
40,000 applications annually (1992 through 1998) to more than lOO,OOO in

15. SHAH, supra note I. at 104-09.
16. Race Relations Act, § 19(d) (1976) (Eng.).
17. SHAH, supra note I, at 132, 137.
18. HOME OFFICE, CONTROL OF IMMIGRATION: STATISTICS, THIRD QUARTER (1985), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uklrdslimmigrationl.html(last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
19. HOME OFFICE, ASYLUM STATISTICS (2001), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uklrds/
immigrationl.html (last visited Jan. 22,2004).
20. REFUGEE COUNCIL, ASYLUM STATISTICS 1999 TO 2002 (FIRST QUARTER), available at http://
www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/infocentre/stats/stats003.htm (last visited Jan. 22,2004).
21. HOME OFFICE, ASYLUM STATISTICS, SECOND QUARTER 2002 (2002), available at http://
www.homeoffice.gov.uklrds/immigrationl.html(last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
22. See ANNUAL UK ASYLUM STATISTICS, supra note 6.
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UK Asylum Statistics, 1985-2001
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Data source: Refugee Council, Annual UK Asylum Statistics
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/infocentre/stats/stats001.htm
the past two years. Although asylum grant rates have generally been low (5%
in 1992,3% in 1994, and 11 % in 2002), Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR)
- a humanitarian category extending temporary status to many persons not
covered by the Refugee Convention, but for whom return would be dangerous - has been used quite broadly.23 For example, during the Balkans war in
1992, only 5% of asylum applicants were granted asylum, but 63% of the
applicants were granted ELR.24 By 2002, when there was no single humanitarian crisis creating the disproportionate share of applications, the difference
between the two rates was much smaller; 11 % of applicants were granted
refugee status, compared to 20% who were granted ELR.
This increase in numbers has been accompanied by an inability to deport
those who receive neither refugee status nor ELR. A total of 10,785
applicants and their dependants were removed from the UK in 2001, and
another 5000 were removed in the first half of 2002. 25 Although these are
some of the fastest rates of removal on record, they fall far short of the
numbers that the British government would like to see. 26 The British Home
Secretary, David Blunkett, set a target of 30,000 removals a year and had to
23. ELR was replaced in December 2002 by "humanitarian protection," the contours of which are
not yet clear.
24. Figures drawn from HOME OFFICE, 2//95 CONTROL OF IMMIGRATION: STATISTICS, FIRST HALF OF
1995 (Oct. 19, 1995), available at http://www.homeoftice.gov.ukirds/pdfs2Ihosb2195.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2004). Exceptional leave to remain is a humanitarian category for those who do not meet
the Convention definition of refugee, but for whom return would not be safe.
25. ASYLUM STATISTICS, supra note 21, at 6.
26. Id.
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acknowledge in September 2002 that this target was "overambitious.,,27 This
inability to remove is thus creating a system where even failed applicants
know that they can quite likely remain in the UK, adding to the government's
rising sense of pressure at the scale of their asylum problems. 28
Finally, it should be noted that some percentage of those applying for
asylum in the UK are economic migrants, not refugees?9 Currently under
British law, there are very few ways for migrants to establish a legal presence
in the UK other than as a refugee. In January 2002, the UK launched a pilot
highly-skilled migrant worker program, designed to give work permits to
migrants with high educational qualifications and significant professional
work experience, without requiring them to have UK employment already
secured. 30 Other options for managed employment-based migration are
under consideration by the Home Office?1 While those are pending, however, some undetermined number of migrants are attempting to enter the UK
under the aegis of its asylum program. As will be noted below, this has fueled
tremendous criticisms of "bogus" asylum-seekers and of the asylum system
itself. 32
B.

UK Asylum Law and Policy
1. International Law Obligations

The United Kingdom is a party to the 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees 33 ("Refugee Convention") and its 1967 Protocols. Article I of the
Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who "owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the

27. Alan Travis, Home Office Films Roma Deportation, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 21,2002,
at I I.
28. David Leppard, 90% of Asylum Rejects Do Not Leave Britain, SUNDA y TIMES (London), Sept.
15, 2002, at 30.
29. Acknowledging that the figures of rejected asylum-seekers surely contain some mistaken
decisions, of the 286,185 decisions made between 1985 and 2001, approximately 170,000 of those
were deemed to be without merit. See REFUGEE COUNCIL, ASYLUM BY NUMBERS: SUMMARY (Jan. 2002),
available at http://www.refugeecounciLorg.uk/downloads/stats_summary jan_2002. pdf (last visited
Jan. 22, 2004). Looking at one specific pool of refugees planning to seek asylum in the UK, namely
those waiting to cross at Sangatte, UNHCR Commissioner Ruud Lubbers stated that "only a limited
percentage of the people in Sangatte would prove to be refugees." Alan Travis and Owen Boycott, UN
to Break Sangalle Deadlock, THE GUARDIAN (London), July 6, 2002, at I.
30. Home Office, Highly Skilled Migrant Program, available at http://www.workingintheuk.
gov.uk/working_in_the_uk/enlhomepage/schemes_and_programmeslhsmp.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2004).
31. HOME OFFICE, MANAGED MIGRATION, available at http://www.workingintheuk.gov.uk/
working_in_the_uk/en/homepage/news/press/news2.html (last visited Jan. 22,2004).
32. See e.g., Johann Hari, Why is David Blunkett Bullying and Terrifying Asylum-Seekers?, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 3,2003, at 20; Anthony Browne, The Economic Case for Immigration is
More Bogus Than Any Asylum-Seeker, THE TIMES (London), June 20, 2002.
33. 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 429 [V], 189
U.N.T.S. 137 (Dec. 14,1950) [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
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country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country.,,34 Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention establishes the international legal principle of non-refoulement,
prohibiting the return of these persons to the countries where their "life or
freedom would be threatened" on account of one of the categories protected
under Article 1. 35 The Refugee Convention recognizes only two exceptions
to non-refoulement: where there would be a threat to public security, or
where someone who otherwise met the definition of refugee had been
convicted of a particularly serious crime. 36 The broadness of much of this
Convention language means that interpretation of Convention obligations
have been effectively left to the individual states party to the Convention,
resulting in a wide divergence of interpretations across states. 37
The UK is also a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 38 (ICCPR), but with a reservation keeping for itself powers over
immigration. The ICCPR articulates a number of rights - including freedom
from imprisonment, right to trial, and family rights - that are relevant to
many asylum-seekers. 39 The UK's commitments under the European Convention for Human Rights encompass many of these rights, as will be discussed
in greater detail in section II(B), infra.

2. European Obligations: Law and Politics
The European Union (EU) has developed a number of instruments and
policies over the past decade relating to asylum, many of which influence the
debates and the reality of asylum in the UK. The earliest were the Schengen40
and Dublin Conventions,41 both agreed upon in 1990. The United Kingdom
opted out of the Schengen Convention, which focused on strengthening EU
external borders and easing internal border controls. The UK opted out
because it believed that as an island nation, it could control immigration
flows at its borders better than other countries in the EU, on whom the UK
would otherwise depend. 42 It sought to avoid what it saw as the abuse of

34.
35.

[d. at Art. I A(2).
Id. at Art. 33.

36. Id. at Art. 33(2).
37. Colin Harvey. Dissident Voices: Refugees. Human Rights and Asylum in Europe. 9 SOC1AL
AND LEGAL STUDIES 3 (2000).
38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Dec. 16. 1966. 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
39. /d. at §§ 9. 10. 14,23.
40. Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 14,
1985, Belg.-Fr.-ER.G.-Lux.-Neth., 30 LL.M. 68 (1991) (Convention applying the Agreement enacted
June 19, 1990) [hereinafter Schengen Convention].
41. Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum
Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities. June 15, 1990, 30 ILM 425
(1991) [hereinafter Dublin Convention].
42. See Britain and Ireland Opt Out, BBC (Nov. 28, 1997), available at http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/
hi/speciaLreportll997/schengen/135 I l.stm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004). It is interesting to note that
because Ireland shares a common travel area with the UK, it was also forced to opt-out of the
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asylum procedures in Europe, and preferred to keep asylum policy in its own
hands. 43
The Dublin Convention entered into force in 1997 and set forth procedures
to determine where different asylum claims should be heard in Europe. 44
Although the UK is a party to this Convention, it has not passed implementing legislation, which means that the Convention cannot be referred to in a
legal challenge to a government action. 45 Because the Convention has
nonetheless shaped numerous aspects of government policy, its objectives
and implementation are still highly relevant to a discussion of UK asylum
policy. The Convention had two stated objectives: the parties wanted first to
prevent refoulement of genuine asylum-seekers, and second to stop shuffling
asylum-seekers from state to state before anyone state assumed responsibility to process their claim (the so-called "refugees in orbit" problem).46 The
Convention promulgated a series of criteria to assign state responsibility.47
For most applicants, these criteria essentially established a principle of "first
opportunity to make a claim," i.e. a requirement to bring the claim in the first
safe country through which they passed. 48 This principle has failed to meet
the Convention's two objectives. 49 States are not transferring cases more than
they did prior to enactment of the Convention, and the length of time that
asylum-seekers await a state's decision to process their claim has not
decreased. 50
The Convention has also failed from the perspective of asylum-seekers.
First, the principle reduces their ability to choose where to seek asylum, a
decision that is often made based on important considerations like language,
presence of family members other than spouse or child, possibility of feeling

Schengen Convention. Ireland has, however, stated its willingness to comply with Schengen as fully
as it can within the confines of its Common Travel Area obligations. See Simpson, Asylum and
Immigration in the European Union, EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW, Vol. 5(1), at 99-101 (March 1999)
[hereinafter SimpsonJ.
43. Id.
44. See generally. IAN MACDONALD & NICHOLAS BLAKE, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM (4th ed. 1995); Nicholas Blake, The Dublin Convention and Rights of Asylum
Seekers in the European Union, in IMPLEMENTING AMSTERDAM: IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM RIGHTS IN
EC LAW (Elspeth Guild & Carol Harlow, eds., 2001) [hereinafter Blake].
45. Blake, supra note 44, at 96.
46. UNHCR, ASYLUM IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 161 (2000)
[hereinafter UNHCR 20001.
47. These criteria are set forth in Articles 4-8 of the Dublin Convention. Convention Determining
the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of
the European Communities, June 15, 1990,30 I.L.M. 425 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1997).
48. Blake, supra note 44, at 104. For asylum-seekers with a spouse or child recognized as
refugees by another state-party, and for asylum-seekers with a valid visa or residence permit for
another state-party, their claims would be processed by those other states. Dublin Convention, supra
note 41, at Art. 4-5.
49. Blake, supra note 44, at 95 (arguing that "the basic problem with the Dublin Convention ...
is that it does not really work"); Randall Hansen, Asylum Policy in the European Union, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 779, 798 (2000).
50. Blake, supra note 44, at 95.
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integrated into the society, and so forth. sl Second, it exposes asylum-seekers·
to the disparities in asylum law across states party to the Convention,
disparities that may mean the difference between refoulement and asylum for
many asylum-seekers. s2 Finally, Article 3(5) of the Convention permits the
removal of asylum-seekers to non-EU "safe third countries."S3 As different
states within the EU have different interpretations of what might constitute a
"safe third country," the Dublin Convention effectively erodes the protections extended to asylum-seekers under the Refugee Convention.
Foreseeing that the Dublin Convention would not solve Europe's asylum
problems, the European Union concluded the Treaty of Amsterdam ("Amsterdam") in 1997. Amsterdam communitarized asylum and immigration, meaning that parties were required to develop and abide by community-wide
policies on these areas. S4 The United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland
again opted out of this treaty. S5 The UK strongly opposed communitarization
because it feared that common policies would eventually be applied to the
UK, as had happened with other policy issues. 56 Having failed to prevent the
communitarization, the Blair government secured a binding guarantee that
UK would always be able to control its own frontiers. 57
Despite opting out of both Schengen and Amsterdam, the UK has stayed
engaged with Europe on the development of asylum policy. The reasons for
this are intimately connected with the broader domestic political question of
the extent to which the UK should be engaged in the European Union. Until
1997, the UK firmly resisted Europeanization. Prime Ministers Thatcher and
Major both successfully inveighed against the "conspiracy to rob Britain of
its history and its democracy.,,58 A movement of "Euro-skeptics" (largely
aligned with the Conservative party) successfully shaped the debate as one in
which Britain's very sovereignty was at stake. 59 The Euro-skeptic view was
set 'back by the election of the Labor government of Prime Minister Tony
Blair in 1997. Since 1997, there has been an increasing governmental
willingness to engage with Europe on many issues, particularly on issues of

51.
52.

Id. at 107-108.
Id. at 110.
53, REFUGEE COUNCIL, THE DUBUN CONVENTION ON ASYLUM ApPUCATIONS: WHAT IT MEANS AND
How IT'S SUPPOSED TO WORK (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.refugeecounciLorg.uk (last visited
Jan. 20, 2004).
54. Specifically, Amsterdam moved these issues from the inter-governmental "third pillar" of the
EU governance framework. to the supranational "first pillar." which requires member states to
develop and abide by community-wide asylum policies. See generally Simpson, supra note 42.
55. N.P. Berkowitz & c.Po Doebbler, The European Dimension of Asylum Law, in UNITED
KINGDOM ASYLUM LAW IN ITS EUROPEAN CONTEXT (Prakash Shah & Curtis Francis Doebbler, eds.,
1999).
56. Sarah Helm, Amsterdam Summit: Blair Forced TO Sacrifice Powers on Immigration, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), June 17, 1997, at 12,
57. Id.
58. Philip Stephens, Preparing to Let Go of the Past. FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Feb. 22, 2002,
at 19.
59, Europe's Incoming Tide, THE ECONOMIST (U.S. Edition), S12, Nov. 6,1999.

404

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:395

asylum and immigration,60 where Blair hopes he may be able to defeat the
Euro-skeptics by showing how engagement with Europe will permit Britain
to shape debates and policies to its advantage. 61 Such a defeat is central to the
Blair government's primary goal of having the UK adopt the single European
currency (the Euro), which can only be done if the government manages to
disarm these Euro-skeptics. 62
The recent EU summit in Seville shows both the ongoing UK engagement
with European policies, and the way that these "Europe" debates play out in
UK domestic politics. In an effort to show that the UK could set some of the
terms in the European immigration debate, the Blair government put forward
a restrictive proposal on illegal immigration which would condition the
receipt of development aid upon efforts to cooperate with policies stemming
the flow of illegal immigration. 63 The severity of this proposal was designed
to sell the government's broader EU policy to Euro-skeptics,64 at the price of
alienating members of Mr. Blair's own government. 65 When the proposal
was resoundingly defeated at the Summit, however,66 this defeat caused
Conservatives in the UK to assert that Blair's vision of changing the
European debates to the UK's advantage was "shallow spin ... For all your
talk of leading in Europe and winning the argument, you have once again lost
the argument and been left behind.,,67 The broad implication of this failed
Seville initiative is that the Blair government appears willing to use asylum
policy as a point of leverage to accomplish other policy objectives.

3. Domestic Statutes
Asylum law in the United Kingdom is currently in a state of flux, with four
major attempts to reform the law in the past ten years, including the recent
passage of the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. 68 This section
describes some key provisions of recent statues, leading up to passage of the
2002 Act.

60. See e.g., Blair and Eumland, BBC (2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.ukfhi/english/static/
in_depth/ukl200 J/uk_and_europe/l997 _2002.stm (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
61. See id.
62. Nicholas Watt, EU Rejects Blair's Line on Asylum, THE OBSERVER, June 23, 2002, at 2.
63. /d. (noting that the proposal was directed particularly at Turkey and Bosnia, two countries
that "refuse to crack down on asylum-seekers passing through their borders").
64. [d.
65. The proposal was sharply criticized by Clare Short, then the International Development
Secretary in Mr. Blair's own government, who called it "morally repugnant." See Andrew Grice,
Blair Concedes EU Summit Not Tough Enough on Migrants, THE INDEPENDENT (London), June 25,
2002, at 8. Short later resigned her position in protest over Britain's support for the war in Iraq.
Michael White, Clare Short Resignation, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 13,2003, at 1.
66. George Jones, Blair Admits EU Summit Setback Over Refugees, Asylum, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), June 25, 2002, at 8.
67. Andrew Grice, Blair Concedes EU Summit Not Tough Enough on Migrants, THE INDEPENDENT (London), June 25, 2002, at 8.
68. EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, 200 I COUNTRY REPORT: UNITED KINGDOM 250
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.ecre.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
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The existence of a large caseload of asylum applications prompted
Parliament in 1993 to pass an Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act. 69 The
Act incorporated the Refugee Convention into British law. 70 The Act also
incorporated the safe third country principle into UK law/I introduced
carrier sanctions,72 and - responding to the growing backlog in cases - set
forth principles for fast-track appeals. Prior to this act, all appeals were heard
in a basic two-tiered system that had been set up in 1969; under this structure,
there was first a set of claim adjudicators who were separate from the
immigration administration, and then an appeal body known as the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. 73 In the new system established by the 1993 Act,
asylum-seekers were now divided into two tracks; those considered to have
made claims "without foundation" would receive a truncated appeals process, while other claims would go through the long-established two-tiered
process. 74
The 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act fine-tuned and entrenched the
principle of fast-track appeals, applying the truncated appeals process to
more categories of asylum-seekers. 75 The Act included a "white list" of safe
countries of origin; applicants from these countries were presumed to have
"manifestly unfounded" cases, and could therefore be placed in the fast-track
procedure. 76 Under this Act, safe countries included India, a country that had
been found unsafe in a recent European Court of Human Rights case,
Chahal. 77 The basic criteria for determining whether an origin country was
safe were (1) that there be no general, serious risk of persecution, (2) that
there be large numbers of asylum-applicants from that country, and (3) that
many of their claims would prove to be unfounded. 78 As with earlier
legislative reforms, these changes responded to the increasing pressure on the

69. SHAH, supra note I, at 179.
70. Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993, § 2 (Eng.) (asserting that "nothing in the
immigration rule ... shall lay down any practice which would be contrary to the [Refugee]
Convention") [hereinafter Asylum Appeals Act].
71. Id. at § 1 (noting that UK obligations include those undertaken in the Dublin Convention,
Articles 4-8). See also Ken McGuire, 'No Entry:' A Critical Reading of the Asylum and Immigration
Act of 1996, in UNITED KINGDOM ASYLUM LAW IN ITS EUROPEAN CONTEXT 67 (Prakash Shah and
Curtis Francis Doebbler eds., 1999).
72. Asylum Appeals Act, supra note 70, at § 12 (Carrier's Liability for Transit Passengers,
repealed by the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act).
73. Colin Harvey, SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UK: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 155-56 (2000)
[hereinafter SEEKING ASYLUM].
74. [d.
75. McGuire, supra note 71 at 67.
76. Debbie Winterbourne and Prakash Shah, Refugees and Safe Countries of Origin, in UNITED
KINGDOM ASYLUM LAW IN ITS EUROPEAN CONTEXT 75 (Prakash Shah and Curtis Francis Doebbler
eds., 1999).
77. SEEKING ASYLUM, supra note 73, at 192. For a full discussion of Chahal, see also Blake,
supra note 44, at 112-13.
78. He Hansard VoL 268 coL 703 (Dec. II, 1995), cited in SEEKING ASYLUM, supra note 73, at
192. As Guy Goodwin-Gill has pointed out, these criteria are logically inconsistent; countries where
claims are likely to be well-founded are also likely to produce far greater numbers of asylum-seekers.
Guy Goodwin-Gill, Asylum 2001: A Convention and a Purpose, INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 13(1) (2001).
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asylum system in the UK, and were seen as a way to more expeditiously
resolve claims.79 The "white list" approach was abandoned with the 1999
Immigration and Asylum Act.
The sweeping Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999 responded to the
increasing backlog of pending asylum claims, and included important policy
and procedural changes. 8o The most significant of these was the decision to
distinguish between citizens and non-citizens in the provision of social
welfare. The Act established a voucher system for financial support while
asylum claims were pending, a system that asylum advocates described as
"humiliating.,,81 Another major policy change was the decision to promote
dispersal, housing asylum-seekers at government expense in dispersed private accommodations so as to relieve pressure on cities targeted by many
asylum-seekers. 82 The Act also toughened the series of penalties related to
carrier's liability, some of which would later be invalidated by the courtS. 83
Procedurally, the Act created a new right to appeal public benefits decisions
to a special adjudicator, but only once; the decision reached by the special
adjudicator was to be fina1. 84 The Act also included measures to ensure that
those who represented asylum-seekers were competent, in the interests of
providing asylum-seekers with the fullest opportunity to be heard .85
The Act also maintained some troubling limits on appeal. The Home
Secretary maintained the power to certify that an appeal was just being made
to stall for time, or that human rights concerns about a "safe third country"
were "manifestly unfounded," thereby terminating the asylum-seekers right
to further appeal. R6 Moreover, fast-tracked claims could only be heard by
adjudicators, the quality of whose decisions tends not to match the quality of
the higher body, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. 87
The 1999 Act can be seen as part of a larger governmental policy to deter
asylum-seeking. 88 Home Secretary David Blunkett began to pursue a multiprong strategy under the 1999 Act, which included the use of "accommoda-

79. SHAH, supra note I, at 179.
80. See generally, SEEKING ASYLUM, supra note 73 at 193-98.
81. Id. at 194. The voucher scheme was heavily criticized by asylum advocates who saw it as
"humiliating." Asylum Aid, Statement by Asylum Aid on Home Office Immigration and Asylum White
Paper (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.asylumaid.org.uk (last visited Jan. 27,2004).
82. SEEKING ASYLUM, supra note 73, at 195. A large number of those dispersed ended up in
non-traditional locations like Glasgow. Scottish Refugee Council, Briefing Figures (2002), available
at http://www.scottishrefugeecouncil.org.uklevents (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
83. Immigration & Asylum Act, 1999, §§ 32-43, (Eng.).
84. Id. § 102.
85. Id. at sched. 4, 1999, (Eng.), cited in SEEKING ASYLUM, supra note 73, at 200.
86. Id., § 72(2).
87. Ann Treneman, The Asylum Lottery, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 8, 2002, at 2(7); see also
SEEKING ASYLUM, supra note 73, at 203-04. While acknowledging the overwhelming magnitude of
claims adjudicators must handle, Harvey presents a troubling sense that many initial claims made by
these adjudicators arc not decidcd as carefully as their subject matter merits. Id.
88. SEEKING ASYLUM, supra note 73, at 197-98.
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tion centers, .. 89 fast-tracking applications,90 and removing work privileges
for asylum-seekers. 91 One controversial effort to deter asylum-seekers was
the video-taping of 48 failed Roma asylum-seekers as they were deported;
the videotape was to be shown on Czech television to deter other Roma from
seeking asylum in the UK. 92 Given the fact that many asylum-seekers do not
leave their homes intending to come specifically to the United Kingdom,93 it
is unclear how effective such tactics will be, but the Government's commitment to deterrence policies and practices has not wavered.
II.

RECENT CHANGES TO UK ASYLUM LAW

In the context of all the above changes and pressures, domestic and
European alike, the Blair government introduced a bill in 2002 that would
introduce new restrictions into the asylum system and reform immigration
and nationality law. At the same time, the British courts have become
increasingly active in protecting the rights of asylum-seekers in the UK,
following the passage of the 1998 Human Rights Act. This section examines
these competing trends, turning first to the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and
Asylum Act and then to the body of case law that has developed since the
Human Rights Act took effect.
A.

Secure Borders, Safe Haven: The 2002 Nationality, Immigration and
Asylum Act

In February 2002, the Blair government issued a White Paper entitled
Secure Borders, Safe Haven. 94 This paper spelled out the government's
priorities for, among other things, reform of the asylum system in the United
Kingdom. Although the title implies a balancing of security interests and
refugee protection obligations, Secure Borders proposed to move the UK in a
more restrictive direction. Secure Borders suggested replacing the 1999 Act's
dispersal policy with greater use of detention, and replacing the voucher
system with a cash system accompanied by tight controls on asylum-seekers,

89. Alan Travis, Blunkett Turns to Middle England for Asylum Centre Sites, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 19.2002, at 10.
90. See Anthony Browne, Asylum·Seekers Make Britain First Choice, THE TIMES (London), Sept.
13,2002, at 4.
91. See Alan Travis, Asylum Seekers Face Curb on Work, THE GUARDIAN (London), July 23,
2002, at 10.
92. Alan Travis, Home Office Films Roma Deportation, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 21,2000,
at 11.
93. Jon Henley, Britain "Ill Informed about Sangatte": Study Shows Majority of Asylum Seekers
Do Not See French Refugee Camp as Gateway to Easy Life in Britain, THE GUARDIAN (London), June
25, 2002, at 8.
.
94.
HOME OFFICE, Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain,
United Kingdom Home Office (2002), available at http://www.official-documents.co.ukldocumentl
cm53/5387/cm5387.pdf.
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with a view to facilitating their ultimate deportation. 95 Secure Borders also
emphasized the problems of "asylum shopping" and immigration abuse,
while largely ignoring the reasons for which many asylum-seekers leave their
countries of origin and because of which many of the asylum-seekers meritand eventually gain - protection under the Refugee Convention. 96
A bill based closely on Secure Borders, Safe Haven was introduced in
Parliament on April 12, 2002.97 With modest amendments, the bill was
adopted as the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act on November 8,
2002. 98 Home Secretary Blunkett hailed the Act as the most significant
reform of immigration and asylum in decades. 99
Two central provisions of the Act indicate that the Blair government's
response to the vastly increased numbers of asylum applications, and to the
political unpopUlarity of asylum, is to move toward greater restrictionism.
First, the Act adopts a three-tiered system of arrival, accommodation and
removal centers, to replace the current dispersal system. Two accommodation centers exist already, and have been used increasingly since October
2001; they have security systems equivalent to mid-level prisons. IOO The
Government has justified the shift to using detention centers by highlighting
the flight-risk posed by asylum-seekers, many of whom abscond once they
arrive. 101 The proposal to build many more of these centers has been
enormously controversial. Asylum advocates oppose the ghetto-ization of
asylum-seekers,I02 while residents of rural areas oppose the plans to locate
the accommodation centers in rural areas. l03 To secure the approval of the
House of Lords, Blunkett had to make compromises to ensure that at least
some of the planned centers would be constructed in urban areas, not rural
areas as originally envisioned. 104 A separate question is whether the centers
will be effective; if all centers are built, they could house a maximum of
4,000 people at a time, when the UK receives between twenty and twenty95. Asylum Aid. Statement by Asylum Aid on Home Office Immigration and Asylum White Paper
(Mar. 2002), available at http://www.asylumaid.org.uk (last visited Jan. 27,2004).
96. /d.
97. Greg Hurst, Workplace Will Offer No Asylum to Migrants, THE TiMES (LONDON), Apr. 13,
2002. For the full text of the bill, see http://www.publications.parliament.ukipa/cm200102/cmbills/
119/2002119.pdf.
98. Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act, 2002, (Eng.) [hereinafter NIA Act].
99. Office of the Home Secretary, Overarching Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Reform
(Nov. 8, 2002), available at http://213.l21.2l4.245/n_story.asp?item_id=253.
100. Raekha Prasad, Toddlers Behind the Razor Wire: Children Are the Innocent Victims of
Britain s Hardline Asylum Policy, THE GUARDIAN (London), July 30, 2002, at 14.
10 1. Id. (noting that no data have been presented to support this claim).
102. Alan Travis, Minister Stirs Row Over Plans for 15 New Centers, THE GUARDIAN (London),
May 15,2002, at 4.
103. See e.g., Vikram Dodd, Protesters Rally at Asylum Centre Site, THE GUARDIAN (London),
July 8, 2002, at 10; Protest Over Asylum Centre, THE OBSERVER, Sept. I, 2002, at 4.
104. The House of Lords resoundingly spoke against these rural centers, sending the Bill back to
the House of Commons for reworking on more acceptable lines. See Ben Russell, Blunkett in
Climb-Down Over Asylum Centres, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 5, 2002, at 2; see alsn
Editorial, The House of Lords is Perfectly Right to Attack Mr. Blunkett's Foolish Law, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 10,2002, at 20 [hereinafter Editorial].
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five times that number of asylum-applicants each year. Beyond criticisms of
the potential ineffectiveness of these centers, there are also human rights
concerns with the centers. Children will be educated in these centers, not in
local schools, which suggests a return to a discredited "separate but equal"
philosophy of education. 105
The second set of provisions in the Act concerns appeals. The Act
articulates a new appeals process for asylum-seekers, with an emphasis on
speedy determination of appeals. One controversial aspect of this portion of
the Act is the ability to send asylum-seekers to a safe third-country without an
appeal; 106 moreover, there is a rebuttable presumption in the Act that the ten
countries poised to join the EU under enlargement are safe third-countries. 107
Applicants making clearly unfounded claims will have no right to appeal
in-country. 108 These changes have been made to advance the Government's
goal of a "fair and effective" appeals system that prevents the system being
undermined by "meritless applications." 109
The modest privileges extended in the Act, such as increased financial
support for voluntary return, and promotion of refugee integration, fail to
balance the restrictiveness of the two policies detailed above. Other restrictive provisions also litter the Act, such as the removal of social support for
asylum-seekers who cannot prove that they applied for asylum "as soon as
reasonably practicable" after their arrival in the UK.110 The National Asylum
Support Service (NASS) indicates that this may affect approximately 100
cases daily. III The Government earlier announced that it would end its
presumption that all destitute asylum-seekers would receive NASS support. 112
Not all of the new policies may be fully or immediately implemented,
however, because of three obstacles. First, many of the provisions, including
ones related to the controversial detention centers, need to be made via
ministerial orders; given the political potency of the detention centers, such
orders are likely to generate tremendous opposition and ministers will thus be

105. Philip Johnston, Asylum Plans Contain 'J4 Breaches of Human Rights', THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), June 22, 2002, at 14.
106. NIAAct, supra note 98, § 93.
107. NIA Act, supra note 98, cAl § 115(7). See also Refugee Council, The Nationality,
Immigratioll alld Asylum Act 2002: Changes to the Asylum System in the UK, REFUGEE COUNCIL
BRIEFING IS (Dec. 2002) [hereinafter REFUGEE COUNCIL BRIEFING].
108. NIA Act, supra note 98, c.41 § 115.
109. Statement hy Baroness Scotland, Minister at the Lord Chancellor's Department, quoted in
Home Office, Overarching Nationality Immigration and Asylum Reform, Press Release 294/2002
(Nov. 8, 2002), available at http://213.121.214.245/n_story.asp?item_id=253 (last visited Jan. 27,
2004).
110. REFUGEE COUNCIL BRIEFING, supra note 107, at IS. The Refugee Council notes the irony that
this measure was first suggested in 1996 by the Conservative government, to the resounding criticism
of the Labor party.
Ill. I d. at 16.
112. David Blunkett, We are a Haven for the Persecuted, But Not a Home to Liars and Cheats,
THE TIMES (London), Oct. 7, 2002, at 18.
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cautious and slow in promulgating the orders. I 13 Second, in October 2002,
the Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights identified several places
where the bill possibly breached human rights; these provisions are likely to
face judicial challenges. 114 The Committee's report urged the Parliament to
"improve the safeguards for these rights, including the rights to freedom
from inhuman or degrading treatment, to liberty, to respect for private and
family life, to adequate housing, food and clothing, and to appropriate
protection and humanitarian assistance for children seeking asylum.,,115
Third, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the judicial system has
shown itself willing to use judicial review to question and re-interpret
statutory provisions that conflict with the European Convention on Human
Rights. I 16
B.

Policy Developments and Legislative Proposals in 2003

Only one year after the National Immigration and Asylum Act received
royal assent, the Blair government introduced a new Asylum and Immigration bill that seeks to remove a critical layer from the appeals structure. The
bill proposes the elimination of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, which is
the second-tier tribunal in the asylum adjudication system. 1I7 Because this
tribunal over-turns roughly one-fifth of the lower tribunal's decisions in
asylum cases,118 the measure would constitute a serious attack on thc
effectiveness and fairness of the asylum adjudication system.
The Blair government also instituted or considered numerous other measures in 2003. First, the government ran a pilot project to assess the fast-track
detention system at the Harmondsworth Detention Centre in London. Without evaluating whether the process worked, the government decided to
continue fast-tracking. 119 Although the government's Chief Inspector of
Prisons determined that this facility was unsafe, at least in part because of the
"constant flux" of people being detained there,I2O the Home Office an-

113. See Refugee Council, Nationality. Immigration and Asylum Bill Today Receives Royal
Assent (Nov. 8, 2002), available at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.ukinews/nov2002/curr047.htm
(last visited Jan. 27. 2004).
114. Johnston, supra note lOS.
I IS. HOUSE OF LORDS/HoUSE OF COMMONS JOINT COMMITIEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 23RD REPORT,
HL 176 HR 1255, Session 2001 -02 (Oct. 22,2002), available at http://www.publications.parliament.
uki (last visited Jan. 27,2004).
116. Editorial, supra note 104.
117. Refugee Council, The Refugee Council's Response to New Legislative Proposals on Asylum
Reform (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.ukidownloads/policLbriefings/
leg_props_nov03.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). The full text of the bill is available on the
Refugee Council's website, at http://www.refugeecounciI.org.uk/downloads/policy_briefings/
leg_props_nov03.pdf (last visited Jan. 26.2004).

118.

ld.

I 19. EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILE, 2002 COUNTRY REPORT: UNITED KINGDOM 25 I
(Sept. 2003), available at http://www.ecre.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
120. Nigel Morris, Detention Center Threatens Safety of Asylum-Seekers at Risk after Detention
Centre Attacks, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 29,2003, at 2.
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nounced plans to expand use of the facility. 121 Second, the government made
an ultimately unsuccessful proposal to the European Union to consider U.K
asylum cases in "transit processing centers" located outside the European
Union. 122 Amnesty International criticized this proposal because it would
shift "asylum seekers to zones outside the EU where refugee protection
would be weak and unclear.,,123 Bearing in mind this constantly shifting sea
of new initiatives and reforms, this paper now considers the potentially
stabilizing and moderating influence of the British judiciary.
C.

The Judiciary and Implementation of the Human Rights Act

The British courts have a tradition of judicial activism in the development
and interpretation of asylum law. 124 Even prior to the passage of the Human
Rights Act, the courts were willing to assert the rights of asylum-seekers in
the legal system. 125 Substantively, the decision in Shah/Islam (acknowledging that women can constitute a social group that deserves protection under
the Refugee Convention) expanded the categories of asylum-seekers who
could receive protection in the UK 126 Procedurally, in 1987, the House of
Lords opinion wrote in Bugdaycay that "when an administrative decision
under challenge is said to be one which may put the applicant's life at risk,
the basis ofthe decision must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny.,,127 In
another case, Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, 128 the Court found
that a policy denying benefits to asylum-seekers put genuine asylum-seekers
in the untenable position of choosing between being destitute while their
claims were pending, and returning to countries where they could face
persecution; this was found to violate the asylum-seekers' right of access to
the legal process under the 1993 Asylum Act. Earlier, as Colin Harvey
argues,

121. Home Office, No Let Up Combating Abuse of the Asylum System, Immigration and
Nationality Directorate News 370/2003, Dec. 17,2003, available at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/
news.asp?NewsID=343 (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
122. Rory Watson, Britain Wins Guarded Support for Establishing Asylum Camps Outside EU,
THE TIMES (London), June 4, 2003, at 14; EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, 2002
COUNTRY REPORT: UNITED KINGDOM 256 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.eere.org (last visited
Jan. 26,2004).
123. Alan Travis, Amnesty Condemns Safe Haven Scheme, THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 28,
2003, at 16.
124. See SEEKING ASYLUM, supra note 73, at 157, 169.
125. Hugo Storey, Implications of Incorporation of the ECHR in the Immigration and Asylum
Context, 4 EuR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 453-54 (1998); SEEKING ASYLUM, supra note 73, at 169.
126. R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and another, ex parte Shah; Islam and others v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, I W.L.R. 74 (1998).
127. Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, AC 514 (1987), I All E.R. 940
(1987) at 53 IF.
128. R v. Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of
Immigrants, ex parte B, I w.L.R. 275 (1997) (it is interesting to note that in the opinion of LJ Brown,
perhaps the state could rethink its policy by examining the success other countries had with voucher
schemes; this scheme was later introduced and much criticized by asylum-advocates).
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The courts . . . stepped in to breach the gap that was opening up
between the instrumental pragmatism of the government and the
principles upon which a humane refugee regime should operate. In
practice, the political struggle over the basic terms of asylum policy
shifted into the courts. 129
This movement to protect human rights has been greatly fortified by the
1998 Human Rights Act.
1.

The Human Rights Act

The Human Rights Act of 1998 (HRA) incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law, strengthening British
commitment to many of the rights relevant to refugees. 130 The ECHR most
effectively complements the Refugee Convention through Article 3, which
provides that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.,,131 The European Court of Human Rights, a
judicial body in Strasbourg created to adjudicate disputes under the ECHR,
has interpreted this article to mean that a state violates the ECHR when it
expels an asylum-seeker who "face[s] a real risk of being subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which
he [is] returned.,,132 Unlike the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee
Convention, however, the language of this Article 3 prohibition is absolute,
making no exceptions for national security or criminal convictions. 133
European Court interpretations have tried to limit the usefulness of Article 3
for asylum-seekers by imposing a highly individualized burden of proof,134
but this effort says less about the content of Article 3 than it does about the
Court's wish that asylum-seekers rely primarily on national systems for
protection, and its concern that the Court not become a "surrogate" for
national decision-making regarding asylum and immigration. 135
The ECHR has three additional provisions relevant to asylum-seekers.
Article 5 defines a right to liberty and security, which asserts that an
individual put in detention must be promptly brought before the relevant
authorities, and "his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.,,136 The
Article specifically states that the right to liberty may be deprived for persons

129. SEEKING ASYLUM, supra note 73, at 15!.
130. The Convention's formal name is the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It was originally signed by eight countries, including the United
Kingdom, and now has 44 signatories. 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1953) [hereinafter ECHR). See generally,
Stephen GROSZ, JACK BEATSON AND PETER DUFFY, HUMAN RIGHTS; THE 1998 ACT AND THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION (2000) [hereinafter GROSZ)'
131. ECHR, supra note 130, at art. 3.
132. Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 248, 'R103 (1992).
133. Harvey, supra note 37, at 382-83, 385.
134. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 (1991), cited in Harvey, supra note 37, at 383-4.
135. Harvey, supra note 37, at 383.
136. ECHR, supra note 130, at art. 5(4).

2004]

COMPETING PRESSURES ON

U.K. ASYLUM

POLICY

413

"effecting an unauthorized entry into the country" or persons facing deportation actions. 137 Article 6 articulates the right to a fair trial,138 and has been
used to overturn convictions made under the UK's carrier sanctions laws. 139
Article 8 defines the "right to respect for family and private life.,,140 The
enumerated exceptions to this right are what is necessary for "national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Article 8 has been used
in challenges to deportation of asylum-seekers where those deportations
would negatively affect family life; the European Court for Human Rights
has interpreted that under Article 8, "deportation must be justified as a
proportionate response to a pressing social need in a state.'d41 Most of the
caselaw arising under Article 8 involves "integrated aliens," i.e. aliens with
substantial ties to their community, and it is unclear if the law will be applied
more broadly.142 The rising number of cases brought under this article,
however, suggest the real potential for providing individual remedies under
the ECHR.
A significant limitation of the Human Rights Act is that it only indirectly
incorporated the ECHR, meaning that Convention rights - like common law
- will be vulnerable to any legislation seeking to directly over-ride those
rights. 143 Another effect of the indirect incorporation is that the HRA does not
incorporate the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg. 144 Finally, even with the HRA, the judiciary is unable to overturn
legislation that is incompatible with the ECHR; it can only make a "Declaration of Incompatibility," 145 and report it to Parliament. ,,146
Furthermore, the Human Rights Act does not incorporate Article 13 of the
ECHR. Article 13 states that "[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity." The British government thought the
inclusion of this article would be redundant to the remedy section of the
HRA.147

137. [d. at art. 5(l)(f).
138. Id. at art. 6.
139. International Transport, Roth GmbH & Others v. Home Office, 2001 WL 1476255.
140. ECHR, supra note 130. at art. 8.
141. Ann Sherlock, Deportation of Aliens and A rticle 8 ECHR, EUR. L. REV., 23 Supp HRS, 62-75
(1998) (emphasis added).
142. See generally id.
143. GROSZ, supra note 130. at9.
144. [d. at 16-27.
145. Human Rights Act, § 3(1) (1998) (Eng.).
146. [d. § 4(2).
147. 475 PARL. DEB .. H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 475.
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2. Judicial Implementation of the Human Rights Act and Judicial
Expansionism

Notwithstanding these limitations, the British courts have embraced human rights concepts in their decisions since the passage of the HRA in 1998.
The Courts have used human rights language to extend protection based on
gender claims, 148 to reduce the likelihood of deportation under ECHR Article
8,149 and to overturn certain carrier provisions aimed at reducing the number
of asylum-seekers reaching the UK in the first place, under ECHR Article
6. ISO The courts have paid great deference to the ECHR in many of these
decisions. Particularly noteworthy was the Zenovics case, where an asylumseeker had both an asylum claim and an ECHR-based claim rejected, and was
then told by the government that it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of his
ECHR claim. The Court of Appeal determined that Parliament could "not
possibly have intended" that his rights of appeal be less for his human rights
claim than for his asylum claim, and applied a higher standard, effectively
increasing access to the British courts for those making human rights claims
under the ECHR. lSI More recently, the High Court ruled that the government
had acted unlawfully when it deported an Afghani family to Germany (under
the Dublin Convention), saying that the family's human rights had been
breached by the government's failure to consider the deportation's effect on
their mental health. ls2
Perhaps the most important case demonstrating the judicial willingness to
protect asylum-seekers' rights is R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte Adan. 1S3
The Adan case dealt with the safe third country principle, and whether an
asylum-seeker could be deported to France or Germany, when the asylum
law of both of these countries failed to encompass persecution by non-state
actors. The House of Lords court examined the issue not by turning to UK
statutes, but by lOOking to the purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention. In
Adan, Lord Steyn remarked:
It is accepted, and rightly accepted, by the Secretary of State that it is
a long standing principle of English law that if it would be unlawful to
return the asylum seeker directly to his country of origin where he is
subject to persecution in the relevant sense, it would equally be

148. R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah; Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, LN,L.R. 144 (1999).
149. Ahmadi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2002 WL 2029260 (Article 8 right
to life was being interfered with, since Mrs. Ahmadi's post-traumatic stress was likely to worsen if
she were deported to Germany).
150. International Transport Roth GmbH and Others v. The Home Office, 2001 WL 1476255.
151. Zenovics v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2002 WL 237072.
152. Ahmadi, supra note 149.
153. R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte Adan, 4 All E.R. 774 (1999).

2004]

COMPETING PRESSURES ON

U.K.

ASYLUM POLICY

415

unlawful to return him to a third country which it is known will return
him to his country of origin. 154

Adan was a landmark case, and confirmed the British judiciary's willingness to take a more expansive approach to refugee protection than the
Parliament. The Home Secretary responded to this decision by amending the
1999 Immigration Act to create a presumption that other EU member states
are, by definition, safe. ISS Despite this legislative setback, the "question of a
true interpretation" is likely to be re-litigated,'56 especially with the 2002
Act's affirmation that the presumption applies to the ten states entering the
EU under enlargement.
The judiciary's interpretations do not uniformly benefit asylum-seekers. A
number of recent decisions have been criticized, including the Saadi case,
which considered the deprivation of liberty involved with detaining four
Kurdish asylum-seekers from Iraq, who argued that their detention was a
violation of Article 5 of the ECHR. Acknowledging that any detention
involves a deprivation of liberty, the Court nonetheless said that the brief
detention (a matter of days only) was justified by the government's policy
objective of speedily processing their claims.l S7
The central point, however, is not the uniformity of outcomes, but the fact
that the Courts are willing to interpret legislation in ways that protect
asylum-seeker rights, and do not fear the counter-majoritarian problems of
undermining the legislature when they see that legislation has violated the
human rights of asylum-seekers. ls8 In this vein, the Courts concern themselves more with the purpose and goals of international law than with the
politics behind particular pieces of legislation. As Guy Goodwin-Gill has
written, "there is much practical common sense in many of the rulings
recently handed down by UK courts .. . the object and purpose of the
Convention as a whole, not any narrow, purely linguistic guide, are seen as
the best aids to interpretation." The political fallout from this judicial role
appears not to worry the judiciary. Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, stated in a
public speech that it was the duty of the judiciary to protect human rights for
unpopular minorities like asylum-seekers if the government would not,
specifically stating that "the temporary unpopularity of the judiciary is a price
well worth paying if it ensures that this country remains a democracy
committed to the rule oflaw."lS9

154. Id.. at515C.
155. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Cases and Comments - The Margin of Interpretation: Different of
Disparate?, II INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 730 (1999).
156. Id.
157. R. v. Secretary of State. ex parte Saadi, UKHL 41 (2002).
158. See Harvey, supra note 37, at 383.
159. Arifa Akbar, Judges Will Protect Minorities, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 16,2002, at
4.
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COMPETING FORCES: HUMAN RIGHTS EXPANSION AND ASYLUM
RESTRICTION

A.

Forces for Restriction: Sangatte and Its Aftermath

The forces for restricting asylum law in the UK are most clearly
embodied by the interplay between domestic and European pressures
during the stalemate at the Sangatte camp in France. Sangatte is a refugee
camp near the entrance to the Eurotunnel through which trains from
France to England pass. The tunnel is at the "frontline of Britain's
defences against illegal immigration.,,16o In the two years that the camp
was in operation, dozens of asylum-seekers each week used Sangatte as a
springboard for attempts to enter the United Kingdom,161 and it was a
major center of trafficking. 162
For many in the UK, Sangatte became the symbol of all that was wrong
with UK asylum policy. Home Secretary David Blunkett - the man politically accountable for asylum policy - came under enonnous criticism from
the media and from opposition party members who argued that Sangatte was
only a "symptom, not a cause of the problem.,,163 An editorial in the
conservative Sunday Telegraph opined that thanks to the "failure of British
and French governments to get to grips with the crisis," Sangatte was "now
having a tangible and deleterious effect on people's lives in the southern
counties," and went on to blame the illegal immigration on attractive
government benefits and the government's failure to evict illegal immigrants
who "know that, once they are here, they will almost certainly be allowed to
stay." 164
The camp also created enormous foreign-policy tension between France
and the UK. France accused the UK of attracting asylum-seekers with lax
policies, and the UK criticized France for operating the camp so close to the
tunnel, where it was a magnet for asylum-seekers. 165 The Interior Minister
for France, Nicolas Sarkozy, criticized the UK's "lax regime for asylum
seekers," and pointed to the need for hannonization within Europe to avoid
such problems. 166

160. Comment, Close Sangatte, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 23,2001, at 3.
161. See, e.g., The Relief of Sangarre, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 17,2002, at 26.
162. Adam Sage, Crackdown ill Sangatte Smashes Refugee Smugglers, THE TIMES (London),
Nov. 1,2002, at 17.
163. Philip Delves Broughton and Andrew Sparrow, Blunkett Shuts the Gate at Sangatte, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 27,2002, at 2.
164. The Relief of Sangarte, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. \7,2002, at 26.
165. Philip Johnston, Sangatte to Close bur UK May Take Migrants, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), July 13, 2002, at I.
166. Philip Delves Broughton and Andrew Sparrow, France Blames Lax UK for Sangatte Chaos,
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June I, 2002, at I.
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On September 27, 2002, Blunkett and Sarkozy announced a resolution to
the Sangatte situation: the camp would close,167 and France and the United
Kingdom would evenly divide the responsibility for processing the asylum
claims and divide the financial responsibility to encourage adults and
children to return home. 168 As soon as one problem was thus resolved, the
press pointed to likely new points of pressure on the UK, from Cherbourg to
Calais. 169
Sangatte focused UK attention on fears of the UK being swamped by
refugees and fears of abuse of the asylum system by economic migrants, and
it also furthered convictions that the UK system was grossly inefficient.
These fears and convictions shaped the politics fueling the passage of the
2002 Act, which emphasized the same three concerns: swamping, abuse, and
inefficiency. Blunkett himself referred to the swamping concern when he
appeared on the BBC to defend his Bill, saying that refugee children should
not be swamping British schools. 17o Blunkett also played to fears of abuse by
emphasizing many of the new efforts to deter asylum-seekers by making
asylum in the UK look less attractive; he described these efforts as "stringent
measures aimed at making Britain less attractive to unjustified asylumseekers." 171 Finally, Blunkett was particularly sensitive to criticisms of the
inefficiency of the asylum process. 172 During his tenure, it had become clear
that the 1999 reforms instituted by his predecessor, Jack Straw, were failing;
despite the tough measures aimed at deterring asylum seekers, Blunkett faced
headlines proclaiming that the UK was the favored destination of all
asylum-seekers, and that the numbers had risen in the UK when they were
declining elsewhere. 173 From this political climate, it is easy to see how the
Parliament could pass an act that drastically cut back rights of appeal and
placed unprecedented emphasis on expedited processes.

167. The closure ultimately happened in December 2002. European Council on Refugees and
Exiles, COUNTRY REPORT 2002: UNITED KINGDOM 255 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.ecre.org/
country02/uk_247-256.pdf (last visited Jan. 26,2004).
168. Id. (noting that adults would be offered roughly $2,000, and children $500 to encourage
them to depart the camp).
169. See. e.g .. Symbolism ofSangatte, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 12,2002, at 16.
170. Philip Rudge, Reconciling State Interests with International Responsibilities, 10 INT'L J. OF
REFUGEE L. 14 (1998). Blunkett himself used this term when promoting his bill. Andrew Grice, A Tide
of Tough Rhetoric, But No Sign of Joined· Up Policy on Immigration, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
Apr. 25, 2002, at IS; Oliver Wright, "Swamped" Doctor Claims Health Policy Is Racist, THE TIMES
(London), Apr. 2S, 2002.
17!. Philip Webster, Labour's New Iron Curtain for Refugees, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 7, 2002,
at !.
172. Following a week when a conservative immigration watch group published statistics
showing that 90% of failed asylum-seekers remain in Britain, Blunkett himself wrote an op-ed
responding to charges of over-sensitivity, and trying to forestall further attacks. See David Blunkett,
Rather than Compete in a Rush to Judgment, the Media Should Wait for the Facts, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 18, 2002.
173. See, e.g., Anthony Browne, Asylum-Seekers Make Britain First Choice, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 13, 2002, at 4. The irony of these numbers rising for Britain but falling for Europe is
heightened by the fact that Britain opted out of Schengen precisely because it believed itself far better
able to police its borders than Europe would be able to police Europe's borders.
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The battle for the passage of the 2002 Act was hard fought in the pages of
the British media and went far beyond the three specific concerns enumerated
above. In editorials, op-eds, and letters to the editor, it was clear that public
reaction to asylum-seekers was increasingly negative. Although some commentators saw the influx of asylum-seekers, both skilled and unskilled, as a
vital source of new labor, 174 others worried about the asylum-seekers' impact
on the labor market. 175 Elected officials spoke of "gun-toting" asylumseekers, 176 and warned of the crisis brewing because the asylum-seekers "do
not live in accordance with local people's social habits.,,177 Asylum-seekers
themselves recounted tales of being accused of "sucking up taxpayers'
money.,,178 Perhaps not coincidentally, violence against refugees was at
higher level than ever before, with more than 2000 incidents reported in the
two years of the Government's dispersal program. 179 Blunkett justified his
reforms by saying that these concerns reflected an underlying lack of
confidence in the asylum system, and that to increase support for asylum in
the long-term, the Government needed to cut down on abuse to restore
people's faith in the system. 180
The shape of the government's 2002 Act was also influenced more
generally by the trends in asylum law across Europe. Many national asylum
policies are becoming more restrictive as governments in Europe are facing
domestic political pressures to limit the numbers of refugees seeking and
gaining asylum in their countries. Much of the European political pressure
for restriction comes from extreme right parties. The ability of these parties
to manipulate popular fears about asylum into electoral success - what
Matthew Gibney calls the "low politics" of asylum - has led mainstream
parties, conservative and liberal, to adopt some of the same rhetoric of
toughness. It is unclear whether this represents attempts to forestall extreme
right victories, I 81 or from a "loss of nerve" regarding social and economic

174. Richard Woods, Asylum Isn't Working, SUNDAY TIMES (London), May 26, 2002 (noting that
with a shortage of thousands of workers in the national health service. qualified migrants play an
important role).
175. Anthony Browne, The Economic Case for Immigration is More Bogus Than Any Asylum
Seeker, THE TIMES (London), June 20, 2002 (arguing that "large-scale and unskilled immigration is
likely to harm the unskilled and unemployed," among other groups).
176. W.F. Deedes, From Sleepy Market Town to Urban Jungle, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Aug. 3, 2002, at 8.
177. Woods, supra note 174.
178. Colin Cottell, Asylum Seekers: Would You Flee the Land of Your Birth For This?, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 27, 200 I, at 22 (interviewing Ethiopian asylum-seekers who would like to
work while their claims are pending so that people would not think they were wasting government
resources).
179. Ian Burrell and Paul Peachey, Violence Against Refugees New High, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Sept. 16, 2002, at I.
180. Webster, supra note 171.
181. John Hooper, Stoiber Uses Race to Drum Up Votes, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 17,
2002, at \3 (noting that "From the start the conservatives have been faced with a difficult choice:
whether to go for the votes of the broad centre, or try to ride the Europe-wide surge of the populist
right which carried Pim Fortuyn's followers into office in the Netherlands"); see also Andrew Grice,
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policies. 182 What is clear is that the shift is occurring.
Although the political pressure is often driven by extreme right politicians;83 the anti-refugee rhetoric has become increasingly mainstream;84
largely because of the dramatic increases in asylum claims being made. In the
1970s, 13,000 asylum applications were made annually across Western
Europe, but in the year 2000,412,000 claims were made in a single year. 185
Facing dramatically increased numbers of arrivals, governments are seeking
measures that would effectively stem this flow of would-be migrants and are
trying to correct the failures of the Dublin Convention through the harmonization of policies under Amsterdam. 186 While the 2002 Act was being
debated, for example, Denmark announced the imposition of the strictest
asylum policies in its history, eliminating welfare benefits for asylum-seekers
and strengthening the threshold that asylum-seekers would need to meet for a
successful claim. 187 The Danish bill also portrayed immigrants in a "negative
light, thereby aggravating public stereotyping of all immigrants, including
refugees and asylum-seekers.,,188
UNHCR points to four different strategies being used across Europe to
restrict the numbers of asylum claims being made. First is the promotion of
non-arrival policies, implemented through carrier sanctions and visa requirements. 189 Second is the safe third-country policy, which is intended to divert
asylum-seekers who do arrive in a country; essentially, this policy corrects
the weaknesses of the Dublin Convention and permits the deportation of an
asylum-seeker to another country where she or he would not face persecution: 90 Third is governments within the European Union applying the 1951
Refugee Convention increasingly restrictively, precluding claims based on

A Tide of Tough Rhetoric. But No Sign of Joined-Up Policy on Immigration, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Apr. 25, 2002, at 15.
182. Rudge, supra note 170, at II.
183. Consider, for example, assassinated Dutch politician List Pim Fortuyn, and Jean Marie
LePen in France. See, e.g., Michael Gave and David Charter, Straw Puts Asylum at Top of the EU
Agenda, THE TIMES (London), June 20, 2000 (noting the influence of LePen and Fortuyn on British
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw); Quentin Peel, Europe's Immigration Muddle: The EU's Constitutional
Convention needs to Develop a Common Framework to Simplify Policy on Asylum Seekers,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), June 24, 2002, at 23.
184. Matthew 1. Gibney. The State of Asylum: Democratization. Judicialism and Evolution of
Refugee Policy, in THE REFUGEES CONVENTION 50 YEARS ON 20-22 (Susan Kneebone ed.,
2003).
185. /d. at 22-23. Levels in the 1990s were occasionally even higher, as the crisis in the Balkans
created successive waves of refugees. [d.
186. See generally Blake, supra note 44. One of Blake's central arguments is that Dublin's
greatest flaw was being implemented at a time when there were no harmonized standards across the
EU; because of the problems with Dublin, the "goal of a harmonised asylum policy within the [Treaty
of Amsterdam] remains as necessary as ever." /d. at 117.
187. Michael Mann, Uproar Over Asylum May Fail 10 Add Up, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), June
11,2002, at 9.
188. UNHCR, Western Europe: Recent Developments, UNHCR MID-YEAR PROGRESS REPORT
214 (2002).
189. UNHCR 2000, supra note 46.
190. Id.
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gender or persecution by non-state actors. 191 Last is governments hoping to
deter asylum-seekers through their asylum-processing procedures; in this
effort, governments have promoted detention for those whose claims are
pending, and have denied benefits including the ability to work while claims
are pending. 192 All but the third of these strategies are advanced by the 2002
Act in the UK. The 2002 Act, with its emphasis on deterrent measures,
limited judicial review, and reduced benefits establishes the extent to which
the legislative branch of government has internalized the European far right's
approach to asylum. 193 The UK government's proposal in Seville to condition aid upon progress toward combating illegal immigration likewise
indicates the willingness of the government to embrace the view of the
right. 194 Fortunately for the rights of refugees, the judicial branch is moving
in an altogether different direction.
B.

Forces for Expansion: The Human Rights Act and Its Effects

The most dynamic force for expansion of asylum protection in the UK is
the 1998 Human Rights Act ("HRA") detailed above. Despite the fact that it
is only indirectly incorporated and does not incorporate Strasbourg jurisprudence, the HRA is already having a significant impact in the UK and is likely
to be a powerful force for expansion of asylum protections in the UK for
three reasons. First, the Strasbourg jurisprudence, although not binding, will
be highly persuasive within British courtS. 195 Second, courts will generally
exercise a presumption that Parliament has not intended to overrule international law, and will issue interpretations that permit a statute to be in
compliance with international law. 196 Finally, the Courts' ability to make
declarations of incompatibility will provide the kind of "sunshine" technique
that will encourage compliance; 197 the declarations will be rallying points for
human rights groups and others concerned with immigrant rights inside the
United Kingdom. 198

191.
192.
193.

Id. at 162.
[d.
See comments by Nick Hardwick, Executive Director of the Refugee Council, quuted in
Treneman, supra note 87.
194. Michael Gove and David Charter, Straw Puts Asylum at Top of the EU Agenda, THE TIMES
(London), June 20, 2002.
195. See GROSZ, supra note 130, at 16-27.
196. For a compelling discussion of this point, see Curtis Doebbler. Myths and Realities:
International Human Rights Law Relevant to Asylum in Europe, in UNITED KINGDOM ASYLUM LAW IN
ITS EUROPEAN CONTEXT (Prakash Shah & Curtis Francis Doebbler eds., 1999).
197. For full discussion of the role sunshine techniques play in compliance with international
law, see Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to
Engage Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998).
198. Christina M. Kitterman, Note and Comment: The United Kingdom's Human Rights Act of

1998: Will the Parliament Relinquish its Sovereignty to Ensure Human Rights Protection in Domestic
Courts? 7 ILSA J INT'L & COMP L 583, 592 (200 I), citing John Wadham & Helen Mountfield,
BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 (1999).
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The expansionism of the judiciary is supported by several vocal domestic
pressure groups, as well as churches, trade unions, and certain political
figures. 199 Among the most vocal pressure groups are Asylum Aid and the
Refugee Council. Both groups have issued frequent detailed critiques of each
new proposed piece of legislation and policy2°O and often provide reactions
201
In response to the 2002 Act, for example,
to judicial decisions as well.
Asylum Aid offered briefing notes on two provisions of particular concern,
the "draconian and dangerous" new appeals measures 202 and the three-tiered
detention centers?03 The Refugee Council offered similarly strong language
in reaction to a last-minute change made in order to pass the 2002 Act:
"These measures ... have all the feel of a Government in a state of panic ....
[the change] constitutes a fundamental breach to the very core of the United
Nations Refugee Convention.,,204 The Church of England and the Church of
Scotland have both issued statements decrying the Government's immigration and asylum policies,205 although the effectiveness of these statements is
in some doubt. 206 Some political figures have also spoken out in favor of
increased protections for asylum-seekers, including some within Prime
Minister Blair's Labor Party. Glenda Jackson, Labor MP, attacked the act as
it neared passage in Parliament. As the London Times reported, "[t]he asylum
Bill left the Commons in the unusual circumstances of Me Blunkett receiving
praise from opposition parties but being heckled from his own back benches
as Glenda Jackson attacked its provisions to educate refugees' children

199. See, e.g., Church of England's View on Race Relations and Immigration, available at
http://www.cofe.anglican.org/view/index.html(last visited Jan. 23, 2004); and the views of the
Church of Scotland: Church Criticizes Blair Asylum Pledge, BBC News (Feb. 9, 2003), at
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2Ihi/uk_news/scotland/274IY!!7.stm (last visited Jan. 23, 2004) (noting that
"the Church of Scotland's moderator has said he was 'dismayed' by Tony Blair's desire to halve the
number of asylum seekers in the UK").
200. See, e.g., Refugee Council, Government Announcement and Proposals Since Its White
Paper on Asylum, REFUGEE COUNCIL BRIEFING (July 2002), available at http://www.refugeecouncil.
org.uk (last visited Jan. 23, 2004); Asylum Aid, Asylum Aid's response to the Government's extension
of the asylum 'safe list' countries (June 18,2003), at http://www.asylumaid.org.uklPress%20statements/
white_lisCJune_03.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
201. Press Release, Refugee Council, Response to the Ruling Won by Hauliers Challenging
Carrier's Liability Fines (Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk (last visited
Jan. 23, 2004); Press Release, Refugee Council, Law Lords Rule that Detention of Asylum Seekers
whose Cases are being Considered does not Break with Human Rights Legislation (Nov. I, 2002),
available at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
202. Asylum Aid, Briefing Note: Abolishing In-Country Appeals (June 18,2002), available at
http://www.asylumaid.org.uk (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
203. Asylum Aid, Briefing Note: Accommodation Centers (June 18, 2002) available at http://
www.asylumaid.org.uk (last visited Jan. 23,2004).
204. Press Release, Refugee Council, Statement in Response to Home Secretary Proposals (Oct.
7, 2002), available at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
205. See, e.g., Church of England's View on Race Relations and Immigration, supra note 199.
206. Nicholas Pyke, The Church Militant: C of E - The New Archbishop Will Face a Church
Riven by Warring Tribes, INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY (London), July 28, 2002, at 20 (noting that "The
Church of England - along with all the other Christian churches - has maintained a consistent and
principled opposition to the immigration and asylum policies of successive governments, without,
apparently. bringing its influence to bear at all").
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separately in centres, not local schools. ,,207 The Liberal Democrats, Britain's
third major party, have issued a series of statements against the Government
policies, saying with regard to the Seville suggestions that "common crossEurope policies for dealing with asylum seekers is a good objective. Building
a wall around some of the richest countries in the world is an entirely
unacceptable one. ,,208
Although there are European political pressures for restriction, there is
also an increasingly robust human rights movement in the European Union,
comprising intergovernmental and international non-governmental organizations, calling for increased protection of refugees and asylum-seekers.
Groups and networks such as the European Council on Refugees and Exile
and the European Network Against Racism monitor the legal and policy
developments affecting migrants in the hopes of influencing national and
European debates on these issues. 209 As the European Parliament assumes
some role in the formulation of EU asylum policy, the importance of these
groups will only increase; the European Parliament provides the greatest
access and most accountability of the various EU institutions. 2I0
The judiciaries of different European countries are also making contributions toward the protection of refugees. In February 2002, the Federal
Administrative Court in Germany issued a landmark opinion in a refugee
case brought by someone who had fled Taliban persecution in Afghanistan. 211 The court held that an authority that can provide protection can also
persecute, thus over-ruling the long-standing German interpretation that the
Refugee Convention covered only persecution by state actors?12 In April
2003, the German courts held that it violated "essential civil liberties" to
detain individuals pending deportation when there had been no court decision
on their cases?13 France, in a series of cases in 2002, recognized valid claims
of persecution where authorities "intentionally tolerated" practices like

207. Greg Hurst, Peers back Concessions on Asylum and Farms, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 8,
2002, at 16.
208. Press Release, Liberal Democrats, Blunkett Must Not Build a Wall Around Europe (June 26.
2002), available at hup:llwww.li bdems.org. uklindex.cfmlpage.homepage/section.home/article.30 14
(last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
209. See, e.g, European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Observations on rhe Presidency
Conclusions of the European Union Council Meeting, 21 and 22 June 2002, available at http://
www.ecre.org.uk (last visited Jan. 23, 2004); THE AMSTERDAM PROPOSALS OR How TO INFLUENCE
POLICY DEBATES ON IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM (Jan Niessen & Susan Rowlands eds., 2000),
available at http://www.enar-eu.org/en/publication/4thpube.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
210. See generally Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The European Consritution and Cosmopolitan Ideals, 7
COLUM. J. EuR. L. 21 (2001).
211. See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Country Report 2001: Germany (Sept.
2002), available at http://www.ecre.org/countryOI/Germany.pdf(last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
212. A bill codifying this ruling is currently pending in the German legislature. European Council
on Refugees and Exiles, Country Report 2002: Germany 112-13 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.ecre.org/country02/germany_107-120.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
213. Id. at 116.
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anti-Semitic attacks and female genital mutilation?14 The judiciary is not
uniformly protective of refugee rights in Europe: a case in Ireland upheld the
validity of fairly minimal due process for an asylum-seeker from Russia. 2ls
Nonetheless, judiciaries outside the UK seem to mirror what is happening
with the British judiciary - willingness to use judicial review to constrain the
restrictions of the political process. As much of human rights interpretation
evolves into customary international law, the increasing emphasis on refugee
protection will support the increasingly activist views of the British judiciary.
Finally, despite the political pressure to erode refugee rights, the United
Kingdom has substantive, formal obligations under numerous treaties and
conventions above and beyond those which it has incorporated into its
domestic law through the Human Rights Act. The UK is a party to the
Refugee Convention,216 the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights,217 and the Convention Against Torture 218 among others. Moreover,
many of the human rights obligations embodied in the ECHR have become
erga omnes obligations under international law?19 As noted above, courts
will seek to interpret statutes in ways that do not violate such international
obligations.
C.

What Balance May Be Struck?

Excepting for a moment the role of the judiciary, it appears that the
alignment of domestic forces for expansion and restriction of refugee
protections is substantially unbalanced in the UK. The voices for expansion
are persistent, but are frequently drowned out by the voices of those who
point to the variety of problems - both real and imagined - created by vastly
increased numbers of asylum-seekers. Thus, if left to majoritarian processes,
the tide in the UK would likely tum against refugees and asylum-seekers.
What emerges from the foregoing presentation, however, is that the judiciary
can restore the forces to a more even balance, with the potential to neutralize
many of the excesses of the majoritarian process.
This note argues, however, that domestic pressures are not the only ones
being felt by the British government in recent years. From Sangatte to
Seville, the British government has been closely involved in emerging
European policy, knowing that its insulation from Europe is diminishing

214. See generally European Council on Refugees and Exiles Country Report 2001: France
(Sept. 2002), aI'ai/able at http://www.ecre.org/countryOllFrance.pdf(last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
215. European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Country Report 2001: Ireland (Sept. 2002),
available at http://www.ecre.org/countryOllireland.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2004) (describing the
July 200 I case, Zgnat'ev v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform).
216. Refugee Convention, supra note 33.
217. ICCPR, supra note 38.
218. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
219. See Doebbler, supra note 196.
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steadily?20
On the European stage, despite the influence of extreme right parties, it is
less clear that the balance tips toward restrictionism. Asylum advocates such
as the European Council on Refugees and Exile (ECRE) do see various
European measures as embodying a "Fortress Europe" model, which betrays
the spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 221 Rights groups and others fear
the possibility of asylum policies converging at the lowest common denominator of protection. 222 It remains, however, an open question whether asylum
law will indeed converge at the lowest common denominator. First, the
commitments made at the Tampere Summit in 1999 suggest that European
governments are imposing self-restraint as they consider the formulation of a
common policy. At Tampere, the EU heads of state recognized "an absolute
respect for the right to seek asylum.,,223 They also pledged to maintain the
principle of non-refoulement, ensuring that "nobody is sent back to persecution.,,224 Second, the defeat of the British illegal immigration proposal in
Seville suggests that there are forces at play other than those propelling
"Fortress Europe." Third, the judiciaries of these European countries, as
noted in section (B) supra are bound by the same ECHR that has empowered
the British judiciary to protect the rights of asylum-seekers.
Despite fears about Fortress Europe, both UNHCR and ECRE maintain
that harmonization of asylum policies in Europe could, in theory, lead toward
greater protection for refugees. Ruud Lubbers, the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, responded to the Seville Summit by arguing that "Europe's
national asylum systems are badly in need of harmonization .... harmonized
standards could remove many of the reasons why people keep shifting from
one country to another," and asserting a vision of harmonized procedures that
are of sufficiently high quality that procedures facilitate both efficiency and
rapid refugee integration?25 Even more striking, the European Parliament
itself - an entity that as yet has had no institutional role on asylum policy, but
that will become more important under Amsterdam 226 - has urged that
harmonization converge toward higher standards. In January 2000 recommendations, the Parliament urged the Committee of Ministers to move toward

220. See, e.g., Helm, supra note 56.
221. European Council on Refugees and Exile, Comments on the European Commission Staff
Working Paper Revisiting the Dublin Convention (June 2000), available at http://www.ecre.org/
statements/dccomments.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2004). See also Berkowitz and Doebbler, supra
note 55, at 19.
222. Simpson, supra note 42, at 113; UNHCR 2000, supra note 46.
223. See European Council on Refugees and Exile, Observations on the Presidency Conclusion
of the European Council Meeting (June 22, 2002), available at hnp:llwww.ecre.org.uk (last visited
Jan. 23, 2004).
224. Presidency Conclusions, Seville European Council, SN 200102 (June 21-22, 2002), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/european_councillindex_en.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
225. Ruud Lubbers, Tackling the Causes of Asylum, THE OBSERVER (London) (Online Edition),
June 23, 2002, at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,741848,00.html(last visited
Jan. 23, 2004).
226. /d.; see also Simpson, supra note 42.
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harmonization that would improve the standard of protection for asylumseekers. 227 Thus, there is some reason to believe that the negative predictions
of Fortress Europe will prove unfounded.
Perhaps the most significant factor in determining the ultimate direction of
Britain's asylum policy is one that is little discussed in the laws and the
public debates, namely the underlying causes of the vastly increased numbers
of asylum applications. There are two possible responses that would address
this problem from different directions. The first is to acknowledge that at
least some portion of asylum-applicants seek asylum because they are unable
to come to the UK under any other legal status, and yet would like the
economic opportunities available to immigrants in the UK. 228 Recent moves
to create a kind of "green card" equivalent for highly-skilled migrant workers
is a start, but should be much expanded. Such a policy would take the fuel out
of the public perception that asylum-seekers are ill-deserving of government
protection, which would greatly deflate restrictionist pressures. The second
response would be to redouble efforts to improve governance and human
rights conditions in the countries from which refugees are fleeing. As Ruud
Lubbers pointed out following the failed British proposal in Seville, removing aid from countries with illegal immigration problems is exactly the wrong
tactic; the UK should be improving the conditions in those countries so that
fewer people will be forced to leave?29 Although enormously difficult, this
approach has the advantage of honestly living up to the spirit of the Refugee
Convention, while other measures to prevent arrival of asylum-seekers, such
as carrier sanctions, provide only technical compliance. If the Blair government explored either of these approaches, the terms of the debate discussed
above would change dramatically, and the forces for expanded protections
for asylum-seekers would be greatly strengthened.
CONCLUSION

Asylum policy in the United Kingdom is poised at a significant crossroads
between political forces seeking restriction and human rights forces seeking
expanded protection. The sources of these diverging forces are complex; they
derive from differences within the governing party, across the spectrum of
parties, in the judiciary, in the media, among domestic and international
asylum advocacy groups, with governments of other European countries, and
across the general public in both the United Kingdom and Europe. Any
prediction as to how these forces will balance out would be facile, but it is at

227. Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Individual Refugee. 1951 Convention. the Treaty of Amsterdam, in
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Harlow eds., 2001).
228. See Discussion in § I, infra.
229. Press Release, UNHCR, Editorial Opinion: Time for Action in Seville (June 20, 2002),
available at http://www.unhcr.ch (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
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least a reasonable possibility that the ultimate balance will be struck at a
protective level, thanks to both the increasing activism of the judiciary and
the possibility that harmonization of asylum policies across Europe may not
occur at a "least common denominator" level. For this possibility to be
realized, the British government must look more at the underlying causes of
its asylum problems and less at short-term responses that at best only borrow
time.

